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Low carbon heat networks (LCHNs) offer great potential for carbon and heating cost reduction. Despite
these beneﬁts, LCHNs provide for just two per cent of heat demand in the UK, when estimates suggest
they have the potential to provide for around 43 per cent. These low levels of LCHN provision are in stark
contrast to the Nordic nations which exemplify some of the highest quality and most extensive heat
networks in the world. It is within this context that the Pioneer Cities project (the project) was launched
by the UK government to help local authorities overcome barriers to the deployment of LCHNs. This
paper reports the ﬁndings of an evaluation of this project, drawing on 86 interviews across ﬁve local
authorities, analysed using elements of Actor Network Theory (ANT). The evaluation found that the
project’s success has been limited. Participating local authorities have encountered challenges regarding
marketisation, public sector retrenchment and inexperience in mobilising LCHNs. These factors militate
against the formation of the robust actor-networks required to deploy LCHNs. Analysis using ANT reveals
insights into why LCHNs remain elusive in the UK and suggests that policy makers need to strengthen
local authorities’ ability to lead and deliver complex infrastructure projects.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Heat networks (HNs) - systems for distributing heat generated
in a centralised location for residential and commercial heating
requirements- are an important part of low carbon transition plans
across Europe, especially in countries pursuing nuclear phase-out
policies (World Energy Council, 2012). They have also been iden-
tiﬁed by the UK government as an important part of the UK’s fu-
ture low carbon energy supply (DECC, 2012c).Ltd. This is an open access article u
ed with the ﬁnancial support
limate Change. However, the
of the data or in the writing
se),
k (J. Pinder).Governmental commitment to HNs in the UK and elsewhere
stems from a recognition of their potential beneﬁts. They are well
suited to densely populated areas and can reduce carbon emis-
sions when deployed in these environments (DUKES, 2012). A
further beneﬁt is that they can be powered using a variety of fuels,
including lower carbon sources such as biomass and energy from
waste. HNs are also cost-effective compared to individual renew-
able technologies and have the potential to reduce energy costs for
consumers (DECC, 2012a, 2012b, Poyry, 2009; Lund et al., 2010).
Indeed, the UK Committee on Climate Change (UK CCC; 2010)
stated that where HNs utilise low carbon fuel, they represent one
of the most cost-effective carbon abatement measures available.
The promotion of urban HNs, especially low carbon networks,
is a priority of the European Commission and of many European
countries, yet the proportion of total heat demand served by heat
networks varies between European countries, with a highernder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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south (Goodchild, 2015). The Nordic countries in particular possess
some of the highest quality, most extensive heating networks in
the world, with the potential for exporting technology and con-
sultancy elsewhere.
Contrary to the Nordic experience, HNs of any signiﬁcance are
comparatively rare within the UK, providing for just two per cent
of heat demand (DECC, 2012c), when recent estimates suggest that
they have the'technical potential to supply up to 43 per cent of heat
demand…by 2050′ (DECC, 2015a).
There are various historical, technical, ﬁnancial and organisa-
tional reasons for this low provision and it is within this context
that the Pioneer Cities project (the project) was launched by the
UK government in 2013, with the aim of helping to address key
barriers that local authorities (LAs) encounter during the early
stages of HN development and that often prevent deployment.
This is not to suggest that the UK is the only country to experience
challenges in the implementation of HNs. Indeed, even in the
Nordic countries which exhibit the best quality networks, the
drive for greater efﬁciency, consumer accountability and for car-
bon emission reduction still continue (Goodchild, 2015). However,
the focus of this paper is on the UK experience as an example of a
country that faces multiple barriers in mobilising heat networks
and as such, can generate lessons for other countries with little
history of HN deployment but that are considering utilising them
to help decarbonise the heat supply. The learning to emerge from
the UK example may also be of interest to countries considering
expanding or renewing existing HNs, including, for example,
Eastern European states seeking to modernise or replace existing
HNs put in place during the Soviet era.
To help galvanise HN development in some of England’s major
cities and generate exemplar schemes, the project involved the
allocation of grant funding (of between d200,000 and d300,000
per city) to ﬁve English cities to support the early stage planning
and development of HNs powered by low carbon fuel sources
(LCHNs). The funding could be used ﬂexibly by the cities but was
generally used to hire consultants to produce feasibility studies for
new or extended HNs.
The project was developed in recognition of the range of sys-
temic and practical challenges faced by LAs in developing LCHNs in
the UK, as documented by Ambrose (2013); UK CCC (2010); DECC
(2013); Heat and the City (2011) and Kelly et al., 2010, amongst
others. These sources identify four core challenges:
1. Substantial project development costs (in addition to capital
costs) including: feasibility studies, attracting ﬁnance, master
planning and legal advice.
2. Lack of necessary skills and expertise within LAs to deliver such
projects, especially in the absence of established procedures.
3. Obtaining funding to cover capital costs for the implementation
of HNs, particularly in the context of reduced LA budgets since
2010.
4. Little direct ownership over existing energy infrastructure. In
some cases, the ownership and on-going responsibility for ex-
isting HNs has been transferred from LAs to private sector
bodies.
Each of the ﬁve participating cities was at different stages in the
development of plans for LCHNs and had varying levels of relevant
experience. For example, two of the cities had existing HNs that
they wished to expand and de-carbonise, whereas others had no
history of implementing and operating them at all. The precise
nature of the barriers faced therefore varied between cities and
contexts.
The original research objective was to develop an under-
standing of the extent to which the project helped the cities toovercome both the general and the context speciﬁc barriers they
faced in developing LCHNs. A secondary focus was to better un-
derstand the processes that LAs worked through in pursuit of
LCHNs.
Key to the mobilisation of infrastructure projects, such as
LCHNs, is the ability of the lead organisation to forge and sustain
effective networks that bring together all the actors necessary to
enable development or to at least establish its feasibility (Bulkeley
et al., 2006). Identifying the actors required is a challenge in itself,
and there is no established model for HN development, especially
in the UK where there has been and continues to be experi-
mentation with different organisational forms (Heat and the City,
2011). Once a conﬁguration has been agreed upon, the resultant
actor-network must ﬁnd a way to work within and around the
various contextual constraints it faces in achieving its goals (King
et al., 2011).
While previous research into the mobilisation of HNs has ex-
plored the processes involved, focussing heavily on the economic
challenges (Hawkey et al., 2013), there has been little considera-
tion of the'work done’ within those processes to enrol key actors
and draw them into a stable conﬁguration or actor-network cap-
able of delivering LCHNs. This paper draws on data that provides
insights into the attempts of LAs to enrol key actors into such a
network and the relationship between this and their effectiveness
in mobilising HNs. The paper therefore contributes towards ad-
dressing a gap in our current understanding of the factors that can
inhibit HN development.
This paper also recognises that LCHNs represent a'double
challenge’ in the sense that HNs are challenging enough to mo-
bilise but those that utilise low carbon sources are more complex
still (DECC, 2013; King et al., 2011). The speciﬁc challenges in-
volved in mobilising LCHNs, as socio-technological innovations,
have received little attention in the existing literature, which
predominantly considers the development of fossil fuel powered
networks (see Hawkey et al., 2013; Williams, 2010).
The innovatory aspects of LCHNs in turn suggest the use of
appropriate socio-technical theoretical frameworks to con-
textualise the processes involved in their development. In this
paper Actor Network Theory is applied as a framework through
which to understand the work done in the formation of the actor-
networks necessary to mobilise LCHNs and if appropriate, where
they are falling down in pursuit of this goal.
This paper comprises of six sections, including this one. The
following section outlines the analytical framework underpinning
this paper. There then follows a brief explanation of the metho-
dology employed before the main ﬁndings are set out in the fourth
section. Section ﬁve provides a discussion of the results in the
context of the analytical framework and the paper ends with key
conclusions and policy implications.2. Analytical framework
HNs are the outcome of the construction and stabilisation of a
broad collection of human (social) and non-human (technical)
elements. As such, a key question for those seeking to understand
how new HNs are brought about relates to the processes by which
these different elements are drawn together to create a new entity
in the shape of the HN or, in this case, the LCHN. In this vein,
Hawkey et al., 2013 conceptualise HNs through allusion to actor-
network theory (ANT), with particular reference to the need to
consider “the work done to conﬁgure the heterogeneous components
of the system with the aim of establishing a stable foundation for
urban heat and cooling networks” (pp.23).
ANT is highly relevant to HN development, being mostly con-
cerned with understanding how scientists and technical experts
A. Ambrose et al. / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 144–152146interact with one another and with pressure groups and politi-
cians. To secure change, experts have to enlist the support of in-
ﬂuential groups and build supportive networks that comprise the
relevant professions, specialists, and political actors with the po-
tential to inﬂuence a situation. They also have to ensure that the
non-human world behaves in a predictable and conducive manner
(Goodchild, 2015).
In order to forge an effective network, ANT contends that ex-
perts also have to provide reliable information and technical cal-
culations proving the viability of their idea or project and to
translate their positions and requirements into a language that the
other actors can understand and appreciate as being in their best
interests (Goodchild, 2015). In this context, Latour, 1999 work
on'circulatory systems’ can be used to add greater depth to our
understanding of the steps that together actors must take to se-
cure the change they seek: in this case, a transition from'tradi-
tional’ heating systems to LCHNs. Latour outlines ﬁve steps, which
together form pre-requisites to an effective actor-network, as fol-
lows (adapted from Latour, 1999; Tabak, 2015):
 Organisation of the world: the formation of arguments to sup-
port the overall objective, using various instruments to build a
credible supporting evidence base. Including provision of reli-
able information and technical calculations.
 Autonomisation: the position reached when actors have as-
sembled sufﬁcient evidence to support their views and are
credible enough to be considered an'authority’ on a particular
matter. Once achieved, actors are in a position to convince
others of their arguments and form'alliances’.
 Alliances: actors cultivate interest amongst'powerful groups
and institutions’ and enrol them into a network.
 Public representation: promoting public acceptance of the idea
by aligning it to everyday practice.
 ‘Links and knots’: achieving all of the above activities simulta-
neously and in a joined up fashion.
In the context of this paper, there is a stage hidden within La-
tour’s framework which deals with the work done between the
stages of organisation and autonomisation, involving the identiﬁ-
cation and enrolment of key actors required to make the project
happen. In ANT, these stages are known as interessement and en-
rolment (Boelens, 2010). The incorporation of these additional
stages into this analytical framework also responds to Cressman,
2009 criticism that when ANT is used as an evaluative tool, there is
a tendency to examine the inputs and outputs of the network but
not the work done within it.
These stages of interessement and enrolment are particularly
important at the early stages of conceptualising and mobilising
HNs, where greater levels of'faith’ and trust are required in order
to make connections between actors in the absence of tangible or
immediate rewards. This task is made harder still when the aim is
to incorporate relatively novel forms of energy supply into new
developments, as is the case in relation to the use of low carbon
energy sources. In this scenario, the potential beneﬁts of enrolling
in the emergent actor-network are not only distant but poorly
understood, as evidence relating to the economic beneﬁts
and'pay-back’ periods associated with low carbon fuels is incon-
sistent (DfT, 2012).
This paper also aims to consider another factor not previously
addressed in the literature: the processes of translation required to
make a HN project'legible’ for and attractive to different interests.
This might include the development of a ﬁnancial business case to
attract investors or the identiﬁcation of social beneﬁts to secure
public sector and institutional commitment. This signals the im-
portance of considering questions of interdependency or, in other
words, how key actors are enrolled by others to meet their owngoals in this process of developing new actor-networks. Rutland
et al., 2008 summarises the importance of translation and inter-
dependency to the formation of effective actor-networks:
“If actants end up working together … it is not because of any
inherent alignment of interests, but rather because potentially
quite different interests have been translated: compromises
have been made, and actants with diverse interests have been
persuaded that moving toward their objectives can be best
achieved by working with certain others.” (Rutland et al., 2008
p.632).
Heat and the City (2011) suggest that this process of translation
is ongoing and iterative over the lifetime of a project and increases
in complexity in line with the range of actors enrolled.
The circulatory system model incorporating the concepts of
interessement and enrolment is helpful in conveying the com-
plexity of the process through which an actor network is as-
sembled. However, one key set of issues that it does not explicitly
recognise are the additional external pressures that act upon an
actor-network as it emerges. In particular, it is important to re-
cognise action at the local level as taking place “in the shadow of
hierarchy” (Jessop, 1997). Actor-networks rarely operate in isola-
tion and are likely to need to interact with and draw support from
other networks operating at various different levels (for example,
in relation to ﬁnance and technical matters) if they are to realise
their ambitions (Rydin., 2007). In relation to HNs, there is a par-
ticular reliance on such external networks in order to secure ca-
pital funding.
In the past LAs would have been less reliant on external net-
works to raise capital and to organise the supply of heat. During
the 1950s and 60s in the UK, HNs were a more common source of
heat within large LA housing schemes and the relationship be-
tween supplier and consumer was relatively simple. LAs would be
responsible for the production and supply of heat and consumers
charged a ﬁxed price for heat, regardless of consumption (DECC,
2014). Now the context is changed. Geographic consolidation,
nationalisation and then later liberalisation of energy markets
removed LA control over energy systems and their potential role in
LCHNs constrained by state aid and procurement rules (Heat and
the City, 2011). These constraints are illustrated by the existing
evidence on urban energy restructuring which highlights how LAs
are being empowered but concurrently disempowered to act on
energy infrastructure and carbon reduction (see Hodson et al.,
2013; Buck and While, 2015, Bale et al., 2012). Other constraints
include budget cuts and austerity (which have reduced LAs in size
and resource); national policy uncertainty (which restricts long
term strategic planning) and a lack of skills and experience in
undertaking commercial projects.
LAs attempting to deploy LCHNs also face added hurdles in
relation to the market for low carbon heat provision, in particular
the potential of low carbon fuel sources to compete with the cost
and convenience of gas, especially since the removal of subsidies
and incentives for renewable energy (DECC, 2015b). Subsidy re-
mains essential, at least in the short term, because consumers will
demand concessions to mitigate the perceived risks associated
with such an unfamiliar arrangement (Poyry, 2009).
There are also questions regarding the level of proﬁt that LAs
and investors would ﬁnd acceptable and expectations regarding
the timescales in which networks should become proﬁtable. A HN
may be rendered inviable if expectations of proﬁt are too high (or
too distant in time) to enable pricing competitive with gas (Poyry,
2009). Returns on investment from HNs tend to be more gradual
(which may not appeal to investors) and therefore require long
term interdependencies between consumer and supplier (which
may not appeal to the consumer) (King et al., 2010). Hence, there
are a great many economic challenges facing the actor-networks
charged with driving forward LCHNs.
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through the concept of economisation, of which marketisation (or
the establishment of markets) is one form (Çaliskan and Callon,
2010). Caliskan and Callon (2010) convey the challenges that
marketisation pose for actor-networks through their con-
ceptualisation of markets as a space of confrontation and power
struggles where “multiple contradictory deﬁnitions and valuations of
goods as well as agents oppose one another until the terms of the
transaction are peacefully determined by pricing mechanisms.”
(pp.4). In relation to a LCHN based in the UK, the pricing me-
chanism will be determined by the imperative to keep heat costs
below those of gas. Part of the consideration here for prospective
customers will be the'opportunity costs’ of joining a network and
the subsequent technical and practical costs and implications. The
choice facing consumers is therefore not a simple price compar-
ison between their current and potential heat costs; they must
also consider whether, in light of the economic constraints out-
lined, it is worth their while.
These factors means that LAs are operating in a constrained
environment and are not well positioned to take the kind of
commercial risks outlined above. However, in spite of these dis-
advantages, the UK government continues to charge LAs with the
task of driving forward various energy and infrastructure in-
itiatives, usually as part of small scale experiments or short term
projects rarely linked to larger scale programmes.
The preceding discussion suggests that, as argued by Cressman,
2009, ANT is a suitable tool for enabling deeper analysis and
evaluation of actor- networks. The analytical framework used
within this paper to frame and interpret the data will comprise of
a combination of Latour’s circulatory system and broader elements
of ANT, such as the concepts of interessement, enrolment and
marketisation. While the circulatory system deals primarily with
the stages involved in the formation of an actor-network, inter-
essement and enrolment provide more detailed insights into the
initial recruitment of key actors, and marketisation accommodates
the economic issues bound up with the mobilisation of LCHNs.
The remainder of this paper will focus on the exploration of the
following themes through the data:
 What are the key challenges faced by LAs when attempting to
mobilise LCHNs?
 What is the role of actor-networks in the mobilisation of
LCHNs?
 How have LAs approached the task of mobilising actor-net-
works capable of deploying LCHNs?
 Are LAs best placed to mobilise actor networks for the deploy-
ment of LCHNs?
 How useful and effective is ANT as a way of understanding the
mobilisation of LCHNs?3. Methods
A total of 86 in-depth interviews were conducted with
key'stakeholders’ in each of the ﬁve cities and those who devel-
oped and managed the project within central government. Inter-
views were undertaken over three rounds between 2013 and 2014
to track progress towards implementation. Each city was treated
as a case study, enabling a detailed understanding of the local
context in which it was delivered.
The research followed the principles of ANT in drawing on the
techniques associated with case study research (Tatnall, 2000, p.
80). The aim was to follow the lead of Tabak, 2015 and use in-
depth interviews to track the experiences of the actors as they
attempted to assemble a network, prompting them to reﬂect on
the process at critical points. As is usually the case in ANT,the'network builders’ (in this case the lead ofﬁcers or'project
manager’ within the LAs) were the starting point and it was
through their eyes that the process of network construction was
followed (Cressman, 2009). To enable this, lead ofﬁcers were in-
terviewed at the start of each round of interviews and were also
corresponded with in between interviews to ensure researchers
were kept abreast of project developments, including changes in
strategy, direction and the introduction of new actors. To ensure a
rounded account, the views and perceptions of network leaders
were juxtaposed with those of the critical actors that they sought
to engage.
The lead ofﬁcers led us to the other critical actors within each
city, who typically included some mixture of the following:
 Project manager.
 Strategic lead (senior ofﬁcer with overall responsibility for the
project).
 Politicians (elected councillors).
 Key LA stakeholders - for instance procurement ofﬁcers, plan-
ning ofﬁcers or sustainability/energy ofﬁcers.
 Potential customers of the network.
 Consultants engaged to carry out technical or ﬁnancial feasi-
bility / business case development.
 Suppliers of heat to the network.
The speciﬁc combination of actors interviewed during each
round of interviews was determined in line with which actors
were considered to be critical to progress at that particular point
in the project. This judgement was made by the research team in
consultation with the project lead.
Although the focus of discussion varied between the different
stakeholders and at different stages in the project, the following
themes were explored at each stage of the research: stakeholder
engagement; project governance; engendering and maintaining
political support; drivers of and barriers to progress; progress to-
wards low carbon fuel sources; progress towards deployment and
practical considerations; pricing models.
All interviews were professionally transcribed verbatim and the
data coded geographically and thematically using Nvivo 10 soft-
ware. The former involved looking in detail at the experiences of
individual cities as detailed case studies; the latter involved
comparing and contrasting data across the ﬁve cities, enabling the
research team to explain differences in outcomes.4. Findings
4.1. Making the case for heat networks
The ﬁrst challenge facing LAs was to make the case for the
deployment of LCHNs locally. Prior to taking part in the project, all
the cities held ambitions for either the development of new HNs
or the extension of existing ones and knew broadly where they
wanted to locate them. However, reﬂecting the observations of
Latour, 1999, the LAs were aware that an aspiration alone was not
sufﬁcient and that they would need to establish them as a′positive
modality’ (or an accepted idea) in order to further their ambitions
for HN development. Latour, 1999 contends that a positive mod-
ality can be constructed by developing a narrative that it is difﬁcult
for others to unpick or challenge. An important mechanism for this
can be establishing a body of evidence from credible sources in
support of your cause. Reﬂecting this, four of the ﬁve cities were
aware of the need to enlist experts to help them make a clear
business case for HN development and understood that, in isola-
tion, their assertions would lack credibility (amongst both the
public and investors).
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fact that it’s independent. Partners are a bit sceptical because it's
us trying to sell something, whereas in this case we are trying to
broker a contract for the project, but the work’s been done by
people independent of the LA. I think the fact that you’ve brought
in people who are independent and know the market, it gives it
that sense of professionalism, but it gives it that stamp of authority
as well to say it’s not just a couple of people sitting in the Civic
Centre who have dreamt this up. “(Project sponsor, case study #2).
Four of the ﬁve LAs therefore commissioned consultants to
provide an assessment of the technical and economic feasibility of
their proposals. The ﬁfth city chose to conduct this feasibility work
internally to conserve resources.
Further reﬂecting Latour, 1999 observations, consultants across
the four cities employed a common set of instruments to give form
to the concept of a HN, build an argument for its viability and
create an image of HNs that engenders political and public sup-
port. These instruments included heat mapping (to identify clus-
ters of heat demand); techno-economic assessments (establishing
technical and ﬁnancial viability to enable shortlisting of possible
HNs) and characterisation (more detailed assessment of the fea-
sibility of short listed schemes) and were 'layered up’ to form the
building blocks of the case for HNs. However, as Latour reminds us,
the instruments themselves also require sufﬁcient modality for a
robust and credible case to be made, thus underlining the im-
portance of appointing specialists with sufﬁcient cognitive au-
thority (Wilson, 1983). Because only these specialists have com-
mand of the instruments that they themselves have established as
being the most valid and credible means of assessing viability, they
establish themselves as'gatekeepers to the ﬁeld’ (Tabak, 2015). In
this sense, such consultants have achieved the state of autono-
misation, described by Latour as “the way in which a discipline, a
profession, a clique or an'invisible college’ becomes independent and
forms its own criteria of evaluation and relevance” (Latour, 1999
p.102). LAs therefore have little choice but to delegate responsi-
bility for this task to consultants.
4.2. Identifying and engaging with key actors
Once autonomisation is achieved the next challenge is to culti-
vate interest amongst'powerful groups and institutions’ or'allies’
(Tabak, 2015). In most of the cities, efforts to identify and enlist the
support of such groups and institutions, which may also be de-
scribed as'key stakeholders’ (external to the LA), had been limited
prior to the beginning of the project. In most cases it was left to the
consultants, with some input from the LAs, to identify who they
needed to speak to and lead on initial interessement. LAs believed
that consultants, as the'cognitive authority’ were better positioned
to cultivate interest and speak the language of'business’.
In order to obtain the energy data required to assess viability,
consultants focussed on identifying and approaching the potential
customers of the proposed new or extended network(s) and,
where applicable, organisations who might be able the heat. Their
aim, initially, was to focus on potential consumers with higher
levels of heat demand, including public sector and larger com-
mercial organisations who had been identiﬁed through heat
mapping and could provide an'anchor load’ for the network.
Concurrently, LAs worked internally to enlist the support of local
politicians and senior managers within their organisation, who
would need to sanction plans to emerge from the project.
As feasibility investigations progressed, it became necessary to
engage a broader range of stakeholders including infrastructure
owners and operators, land owners and later, investors/ﬁnanciers
(although the research ended before this stage). Each type of
stakeholder brought its own challenges in terms of interessement
and enrolment and also dissidence.There was no doubt that the LAs themselves would lead the
actor-networks. This might be seen as surprising given the LAs
acceptance that they did not represent a credible authority in re-
lation to HNs, sitting outside the'invisible college’. And, whilst it is
true that LAs have traditionally driven municipal HN development,
this is no longer an inevitability. Nevertheless, LAs were perceived
by government to be the right organisations to lead the projects
due to their (supposed) authority over planning, local knowledge,
social and environmental aims, ability to appeal to a range of ac-
tors and to act as an'honest broker’ (Heat and the City, 2011;
Wedawatta et al., 2014; Pielke, 2007). For these reasons, it is ar-
gued by Heat and the City (2011) that LAs do need to participate in
actor-networks aiming to develop HNs but are not necessarily best
placed to lead them, and that different organisational arrange-
ments may be required at different points in the project devel-
opment cycle.
4.3. Challenges in the interessement of external stakeholders
The process of interessement proved to be challenging, re-
ﬂecting Latour’s view that the creation of allies involves an'e-
normous labour of persuasion and liaison’ (1999, p.104). LAs often
lacked relationships with local businesses, which meant that
consultants were'going in cold’ and trying to establish contact and
build trust with decision makers. This was further complicated by
the fact that in larger private organisations, decisions about the
purchase of energy tend to be made centrally, often as part of bulk
contracts. One LA ofﬁcer (in case study #3) expressed the belief
that medium-sized organisations were amongst the easiest to
enrol because, for them, HNs made more commercial sense than
they may do for smaller and larger organisations. Such organisa-
tions, it was reported, tend to experience large energy bills but do
not beneﬁt from bulk buying. Smaller organisations, he argued,
were not as heavily affected by high energy costs due to relatively
low usage, so the upfront costs of connecting to a HN would be
difﬁcult to justify.
Although LAs tended to have established relationships with
other large public sector organisations, including healthcare trusts,
colleges and universities, these organisations needed to be per-
suaded about the beneﬁts of switching from their existing heat
source. Issues of marketisation were prominent once again be-
cause the price of heat generated from HNs was often estimated to
be similar to or more expensive than gas and it was therefore
necessary to highlight the other beneﬁts of HNs, such as energy
security and carbon savings. Although carbon savings were an
attractive to organisations with carbon reduction targets to meet,
many already had long-term energy contracts or had invested in
their own energy generation. While they were generally happy to
express an interest in principle, most potential customers were
reluctant to make a ﬁrm commitment to connecting to a HN until
exact prices and contract terms had been ﬁxed, and they had
conﬁdence that the network would be built. This created a′catch-
22′ situation, whereby LAs and other investors were unlikely to
progress with building a HN before there was a ﬁrm commitment
from customers.
“It’s chicken and egg because we’re not going to get a network
until somebody signs up to one, they’re not going to sign up to a heat
network until there’s a heat network, and that is common across any
heat network you choose to develop.” (Consultant, case study #3).
Consultants were keen to highlight the difﬁculties experienced
in relation to the interessement of'allies’ or potential customers,
recounting how organisations were reluctant to share information
and sceptical about the beneﬁts of connecting to a HN. In some
cities these difﬁculties were exacerbated by HNs having a re-
putation as being unreliable, but also because of a political land-
scape in which previously adversarial relationships continued to
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critical to the public acceptance of an idea; or the creation of a
positive modality. Tabak, 2015 underlines this point in his dis-
cussion of Latour, stating that ideas must be relatable to people’s′
everyday practice and their systems of belief and opinions’ (p.105).
Consultants faced the'double whammy’ of trying to engage po-
tential customers in an initiative spearheaded by the LA, which
may not be trusted or viewed as a credible business partner, and
that utilises a form of heating that has suffered reputational da-
mage in the past, is unfamiliar to most and perceived as inherently
risky (Heat and the City, 2011). Negotiations between potential
customers and key actors will therefore be protracted and iterative
(Heat and the City, 2011), something borne out by the data pre-
sented here.
Commercial sensitivities also played a part and some organi-
sations were reluctant to release data to a third party. Other
consultants recounted the more practical constraints, for instance:
buildings with electrical heating systems and historic buildings,
making retroﬁtting a connection costly and some potential con-
sumers could not make the decision to connect to a network,
because they were tenants in a building owned by someone else.
4.4. Challenges in the interessement of internal stakeholders
Mobilising HNs also involves the interessement of actors within
LAs. At a strategic level, the support of senior managers and local
politicians was required, without which progress would be im-
possible. This'high level’ support was galvanised by the opportu-
nities the project afforded to deliver against strategic commit-
ments to low carbon heat solutions and by the funding for feasi-
bility studies provided by central government. There were, how-
ever, instances where local contextual factors made it challenging
to engender and maintain this support. For example, organisa-
tional and political ﬂux in one city made it difﬁcult to maintain
focus on the feasibility work, despite support from senior ofﬁcers:
“The [senior manager] left in May and then we went into a
black hole while all that was playing out and it’s taken me all this
time to get some enthusiasm back for it because of everything else
that’s going on.” (Project lead, case study #2).
Elsewhere (in case study 5) dwindling resources, loss of key
personnel and changes in senior management resulted in delays
and a loss of direction.
The second aspect of internal engagement involved the inter-
essement of departments within LAs. HN development cuts across
a wide range of different departmental'silos’, including property
management, waste management, ﬁnance, legal, regeneration and
planning. However, securing the support of these departments
often proved challenging given their competing priorities. For in-
stance, ensuring that a HN links in with and beneﬁts from future
urban development means adopting a'joined up’ approach with
regeneration and planning departments, making HN connections
mandatory for new developments in particular locations. How-
ever, those responsible for encouraging new development may see
this as undermining efforts to attract inward investment into the
city because potential developers may be deterred by the policy.
These challenges were prominent in the account of a senior LA
manager in case study 3, who recounted how:
“… getting the buy-in politically was no problem, getting the
buy-in from other departments has been quite frustrating and
often the project’s only been able to progress at the pace of the
slowest person who also has a million other things to do.”
Such difﬁculties were also attributed to the fact that the mo-
bilisation of HNs involves a degree of cultural change within au-
thorities, requiring ofﬁcers and elected members to think more
commercially and see the LA in the unfamiliar role of energy
provider.4.5. Enrolment and autonomisation
As a consequence of these challenges, only one participating LA
successfully enrolled all of the actors that they needed into an
actor-network, ostensibly as a result of efforts over a number of
years preceding the project. The others had assembled'loose net-
works’, where key actors had agreed to take part in the project in
principle but remained tentative in their commitment. One ex-
ample of this reluctance to fully enrol can be found in case study 2,
where a critical actor- a major civic institution generating waste
heat that the LA envisaged would supply the network- avoided
committing to the project whilst they explored ways of selling
their heat directly to potential customers in the vicinity, thus
displaying dissidence and attempting to bypass the LA altogether.
This particular example highlights difﬁculties in relation to mo-
bilisation and the nomination of LAs as network leaders and raises
questions regarding the extent to which they necessarily represent
the interests of and have the trust of their'constituents’. This
narrative points to the difﬁculties for LAs in autonomising on en-
ergy matters and an associated challenge to craft the cognitive
authority that is arguably a prerequisite of network leaders.
The LA’s leadership of these projects was questioned in three of
the cities and LAs widely reported difﬁculties of securing support
from private sector actors, in particular. In case study 5 such dif-
ﬁculties ultimately led to the collapse of plans developed through
the project, forcing the LA to focus on an existing development led
by a public-private partnership- an altogether'softer’ target to
convince of the merits of HNs. This example illustrates that certain
actors will always be more critical to the success of projects than
others the dissidence of these actors can be detrimental to a
network.
4.6. Utilising low carbon sources
As outlined previously, participating cities were grappling with
a double innovation by trying to introduce not only an unusual
form of heating but one powered by low carbon sources. The cities
were all driven to utilise low carbon sources, primarily due to
strategic carbon reduction commitments.
“Driving progress, we’ve got strategies, we’ve got a carbon target
and we have the ability and the will to decarbonise our heat gen-
eration” (LA ofﬁcer, case study 4).
In three of the cities there was also evidence of pressure from
civic actors (universities, colleges and hospitals) to ensure that
their heat was generated from low carbon sources to help them
achieve carbon reduction targets. As previously outlined, these
organisations were critical players- as either major customers or
suppliers of the network- and tensions were evident between
them and those representing private sector or residential custo-
mers’ interests for whom securing the lowest prices was a higher
priority.
“The council’s listening to the customers, so what we were hearing
was they want lower carbon heat because the higher education
sector’s now got carbon targets which they are seeking to hit, so the
drivers in that sector were greater than perhaps the drivers in other
commercial and residential sectors and that’s been quite important.”
(LA ofﬁcer, case study #3).
Indeed, across the cities it was conceded that heat costs re-
mained the key factor determining whether a potential customer
was likely to connect to the network.
“These projects […] offer lower cost energy and energy security to
businesses and homes in the region. They’re probably the key drivers
over the low carbon drivers, although they are important as well.”
(Senior Manager, case study 1).
Consequently, despite commitments to the principle of low
carbon sources in all of the cities, three of the cities proposed (at
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gas. In these cases, the cities were relying on the increased efﬁ-
ciency of energy supply through the economies of scale derived
from a HN to deliver carbon savings, as opposed to the use of low
carbon sources.
Of the available options for low carbon sources, energy from
waste was the most popular and was either being used in existing
networks, or being considered for new networks in four of the ﬁve
cities. However, energy from waste plants were reported by their
operators to be strategically and ﬁnancially viable without the
inclusion of heat generation: they provided a means of waste
disposal for LAs and additional income through electricity gen-
eration for the plant operator. HNs were a secondary consideration
and the key issue was ensuring that the plant operator did not
suffer ﬁnancial loss as a result of the costs of connecting the plant
to a HN. It could not always be assumed that the operators of
energy from waste plants would agree to supply a HN.
There is evidence in these accounts of LCHNs struggling to
compete with the low gas prices available in the UK and the re-
lative simplicity of installing gas based systems. Overall, therefore,
the scope for the delivery of LCHNs appeared limited, at least in
the short to medium term.
4.7. Constrained actor-networks
The challenges that LAs had encountered, in introducing low
carbon sources to projects, serve as a reminder that the nascent
networks were not operating in isolation and that there were
many external pressures and contextual factors acting upon them.
Common challenges included dwindling resources resulting
from severe budget reductions imposed by central government
since 2010. This meant the loss of key staff and an associated loss
of knowledge, skills and connections. LA actors felt that they did
not possess the levels of resources and inﬂuence necessary to drive
forward large infrastructure projects. In several cases, it was clear
that LAs lacked the'bargaining power’ over other actors. In one
city, the LA had, for ﬁnancial reasons, signed over control of their
HNs to a private company on a long lease and felt frustrated that
they no longer had the power to drive forward its expansion. In
another, the main heat supplier saw no reason to involve the LA in
the network, viewing them as a′middle man’.5. Discussion
The previous section provided insights into challenges en-
countered by LAs when mobilising LCHNs. It is evident that, in
most cases, the cities struggled to progress the deployment of
LCHNs.
Different challenges were manifest at different stages of net-
work formation. At the beginning of the process, LAs did not
possess the skills to produce a robust technical and economic case
for LCHNs (Latour’s′organisation of the world’), deferring attempts
to create a positive modality to the consultants that sit within
the'invisible college’. However, even supported by ostensibly
credible consultants, cities struggled with the interessement of
local actors in the absence of immediate and compelling in-
centives. The interessement of internal stakeholders appeared
easier as they were more driven by environmental and societal
goals around carbon reduction, as opposed to exclusively com-
mercial considerations.
Given these difﬁculties, the task of enrolling key actors into an
actor-network proved difﬁcult and resulted in a series of'loose’
networks of wavering actors unwilling to ﬁrmly commit before a
clear ﬁnancial proposition was made. This low level of commit-
ment increased the likelihood of acts of dissidence amongst keyactors, with potential to further destabilise emergent actor-net-
works. These issues were exacerbated by the inability of LAs to
achieve'autonomisation’ and establish themselves as a cognitive
authority in relation to LCHNs. Yet, despite their lack of credibility
as network leaders, they continued to attempt to fulﬁl this role,
exercising the mandate given to them by central government.
Incorporating low carbon sources into plans for new HNs
proved equally challenging for LAs and their consultants, who
struggled to develop proposals that could compete with the low
cost and convenience of gas. In addition, broader constraints were
bearing down hard on LAs, depleting their resources, power and
inﬂuence. Despite their apparent advantages and greater levels of
credibility, consultants also struggled to persuade key actors to
enrol fully, suggesting that'public representation’ (widespread
acceptance of LCHNs) remained a distant prospect.
A central challenge here relates to translation, which both La-
tour, 1999 and Rutland and Aylett (2013) suggest is common,
whereby network leaders are unable to translate their vision and
potential beneﬁts to other key actors in a way they can all ap-
preciate as being in their best interests. Where translation is
successfully undertaken, public representation follows more ea-
sily. In particular, LAs struggled to effectively ‘pacify’ (Caliskan and
Callon, 2010) the HN as a market object within established, ob-
durate market and infrastructural arrangements. HNs are a dis-
ruptive local innovation. Network-builders therefore face difﬁcul-
ties in economising their projects: turning it from an innovative to
conventional project in order to make it part of established market
arrangements, as well as material energy and urban infra-
structures (Rydin et al., 2014). Important factors in establishing a
paciﬁed market object include standardisation and price-setting
(Caliskan and Callon, 2010). Caliskan and Callon (ibid. p.7) note
that actor-networks are more stable when “… a commodity has
undergone speciﬁc processes of standardisation that transform it into
an entity described in both abstract and precise terms, certiﬁed and
guaranteed by a series of textual and material devices”. Using con-
sultants to produce positive modalities through techno-economic
calculations and feasibility studies was an attempt to do this, but
there was no standard approach to HNs as market objects – in-
deed, each city was approaching it in different ways and were
often uncertain about how best to proceed. The chief means of
stabilisation, and in turn, price-setting was through reference to
mainstream gas markets. This was problematic because potential
customers struggled to see beyond the transaction and opportu-
nity costs of moving to (in their eyes) the uncertain, monopolistic
service provided through a HN.
This led to a ‘catch-22′ situation where no-one made a ﬁrm
commitment to the project in the absence of clearly deﬁned prices,
terms and payback periods. Across the ﬁve projects, no such re-
solution had been reached and potential suppliers and customers
remained reluctant to enter into a negotiation with the LA and
their consultants. If potential customers had been dissatisﬁed with
their current heat supply arrangements, they may have been more
willing to engage on a more speculative basis. The push factors –
such as the price or reliability of existing services – were in-
sufﬁcient to outweigh the costs associated with moving away from
the status quo. These unfavourable conditions suggest that LAs had
arguably been set an impossible task, in so far as the socio-tech-
nical systems for the provision of heat (gas boilers) are too ﬁrmly
embedded and aspirations for moving away from them are un-
dermined by their relative affordability. We might therefore posit
that the failure of the cities to secure progress towards LCHNs had
at least as much to do with issues of marketisation and the su-
premacy of the existing gas infrastructure than network
leadership.
Government maintains that there are considerable beneﬁts
associated with LCHNs, including reductions in carbon emissions
A. Ambrose et al. / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 144–152 151and costs. However, the conditions are not currently right for the
innovation (or double innovation) of LCHNs to break into the
mainstream, particularly as the UK government wavers on their
commitment to carbon reduction and scales back incentives for
renewable energy (DECC, 2015b).
LAs were empowered by government to attempt to roll out an
innovation whose beneﬁts are contested, rendering public re-
presentation very difﬁcult to achieve. It feels, therefore, that it was
premature to charge LAs with the task of propagating LCHNs and
that further work is required to ‘prepare the ground’ through the
development of a supportive policy framework, incentives and
enticements. Indeed, if the UK government are committed to the
deployment of HNs as a key means of decarbonising the heat
supply, they will need to provide more resource to both enable
and ease the transition.
If a central problem was effectively stabilising and mobilising
the concept of the LCHN in order to make it legible as a market
object to other actors, this raises questions regarding the extent to
which LCHNs are currently best mobilised through ﬁnancialised,
market arrangements. At least one participating city responded to
this by introducing mandatory HN connectivity as part of planning
agreements for new developments, thus embedding HNs as the
default form of heat provision. More generally, if LCHNs are seen
as an important tool in low carbon transitions, there is a need for
greater market and non-market incentives for LCHN growth. This
might include greater ﬁnancial resource from central government
to allow network leaders to proceed on the basis of social and
environmental beneﬁts, without immediate need to pay off the
capital costs, which would potentially enable the development of
subsidised provision that could effectively ‘compete’ with estab-
lished gas networks. This is perhaps a simplistic solution, but in
order for innovations to become mainstream there is a need to
nurture their progress. The rapid increase in the deployment of
solar photovoltaics as a result of generous subsidy regimes in a
number of EU states is one example of how this can work.
It is also important to reﬂect here on the extent to which it has
been useful to apply Latour’s circulatory system and other ele-
ments of ANT to the problem of LCHN deployment. A strength of
the Circulatory System is that it encourages detailed and critical
consideration of the process of mobilising an actor-network. In
doing so, this paper contributes towards a notable gap in the lit-
erature around HN development, which has focussed heavily on
economic challenges (Rydin et al., 2014), paying little attention to
the ‘work done’ to enrol crucial actors. However, one lesson to
emerge from this analysis is that the circulatory system does not
enable sufﬁcient interrogation of the processes of actor-network
formation that play out between the stages of ‘organisation’ and
‘autonomisation’ involving the identiﬁcation and enrolment of key
actors. The addition to the analytical framework of Boelens, 2010
concepts of interessement and enrolment are valuable in elucidat-
ing these processes, which can be so critical to the success or
otherwise of an actor-network.
As emphasised in other literature, the ﬁndings suggest that
economic factors are an important barrier to LCHN deployment.
Yet it is important to set this within the context of the economic as
a constructed, not a priori phenomenon made up of simple ar-
rangements of costs, prices, supply and demand: the concept of
marketisation allows us to interrogate these issues within the
broader context of actor-network formation. As the data also
highlights broader constraints are acting upon those attempting to
mobilise LCHNs, such as the retrenchment of LAs in the UK.
Therefore, although ANT provides a useful framework for explor-
ing the role of actor-networks in the mobilisation of LCHNs, its
application should be accompanied by an appreciation of the
broader factors at play.6. Conclusions
The success of the project in helping LAs to overcome key
challenges encountered in the early stage development of LCHNs
was limited. Although exact circumstances differ, participating LAs
encountered a common set of interrelated challenges associated
with the marketisation of LCHNs; the weakened position of LAs in
the face of public sector retrenchment and their lack of experience
in mobilising LCHNs. These factors militate against the formation
of the robust actor-networks required to deploy LCHNs.
But how essential are extensive actor-networks to mobilising
LCHNs? The evidence presented here suggests that LAs could not
act alone in such projects, especially not in a de-regulated energy
market where both users and suppliers of heat freely choose
where, how and from whom they buy and sell heat. Under these
circumstances, LAs must become either masters of persuasion or
wield impressive incentives. Yet, they ﬁnd themselves poorly po-
sitioned to do either, undermining their credibility as leaders of
efforts to mobilise LCHNs.
In an attempt to overcome constrained resources and a lack of
credibility, LAs enlisted consultants to broker an appropriate actor
network. However, despite their apparent credibility, consultants
also struggled to engender the commitment of key actors, sug-
gesting that the incentives on offer were insufﬁcient and the
economic case too weak. As such, this paper provides a clear in-
dication that the dominance of the existing gas network creates a
climate within which any network leader may struggle to en-
gender commitment. Under these circumstances, although LAs
ability to develop such complex infrastructure projects is being
increasingly weakened, the wider infrastructure and regulatory
environment mean that other actors are not necessarily any better
placed to develop LCHNs.
The application of ANT to this scenario has been useful, providing
a framework through which to identify where efforts to mobilise
LCHN projects are falling down. Analysis conducted using different
elements of ANT indicated that marketisation difﬁculties and
broader economic factors undercut the ability of LAs (and their
partners) to deploy LCHNs, making it difﬁcult to get past the ﬁrst
stage of the circulatory system: the organisation of the world. The
combined work of Latour and Boelens then illustrates how a failure
to achieve this ﬁrst stage prevents progress through subsequent
stages, providing insights into why LCHNs remain elusive in the UK.7. Policy implications
This research highlights a range of activities that policy makers
might usefully undertake to support transitions to LCHNs. Al-
though some of these recommendations relate more speciﬁcally to
the UK context, most will resonate to some degree across coun-
tries developing new HNs, extending existing networks or making
the transition to low carbon fuel sources. Activities in support of
LCHNs may include:
 promoting a better image for HNs and dispelling persistent
myths around unreliability and negative environmental impacts
(supporting public representation)
 (re)introducing ﬁnancial incentives to promote the use of low
carbon fuel sources (thus reducing the supremacy of gas in a UK
context) and promoting the development of new low carbon
infrastructure (aiding marketisation);
 covering initial infrastructure costs to help overcome prohibi-
tive’ opportunity costs’;
 strengthening planning authorities’ resources and powers to
mandate heat network connectivity, as part of a broader ethos
which prioritises low carbon development
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techno-economic appraisal of the viability of LCHNs that can be
universally understood by investors and stakeholders, aiding
transparency and enabling comparisons between schemes
(supporting interessment and promoting standardisation).
As part of this package of support, consideration would also
need to be given to the critical question of which agency is best
positioned to lead major infrastructure projects such as LCHNs.
Acknowledgement of the possibility that, in the UK at least, such
initiatives are best led outside of the public sector would, in turn,
raise questions over how societal and environmental objectives
associated with LCHNs would be upheld.Acknowledgements
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